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Once more, it is ordinary language with allits ambiguity that provides a clue that the concept of
definition in mathematics might not be as monolithic as we are led to believe when the claim is
made that definitions are arbitrary and we can define anything any way we wish.
"Beware the double entendre" would be a good slogan to su mm arize a recent article by Reuben Hersh one that ends by enticing the reader to make up slogans w ith some w ords that have technical mathematical as well as ord inary language meanings.' The point
of his creative exercise is to have the reader encounter and perhaps int ernalize what Hersh views as an
importan t lesson that ma y account for difficulties studen ts have in learning mathematics: that ordinary language is not only filled with ambiguous meanings,
but that even when there is no ambiguity in ordinary
language, there is generally either no connection or a
ten uous one between that meaning and the mathematicalone.
As an example of a tenuous connection, Hersh comments,

Thus when we ask someone to sho w that a number
divisible by six is even, it is surely appropriate in ordinary usage to choose one example (like forty-two)
to d emonstrate the point rather than to come up with
some ge neral proof.
The connection between mathematics and ordinary
language can be even more tenuous however in advanced mathematics, as Hersh p oints out. He comments:

.
In ad vanced mathematics, there's more

linguistic confusion. Surds (absurd),
irrational and imaginary numbers, singular perturbations, d egenera te kernel s, strange attractors-all sou nd d angerous, undesirable, things to avoid
(p .51).

If 1 say "I own a number of calcu lus
books...," 1 don't mean zero books....I
don't even mean one book....I mean
two or more (p.48).

It is true that the mismatch between mathematical and
everyday meanings is significan t enough to warrant
our attention, and a disinclination to appreciate this
observation may very well account for problems stuHersh claims that he no w understand s that it was not d ents have in appreciating mathem atical m eaning.
mere ignorance that accounted for the comment ma ny There are, how ever, concomitan t issu es that are either
years ago b y one of hi s stu de n ts who asserted that ignored or distorted by Hersh 's program to clear up
the intended entendre- with the int ention of minim izzero was not a number.
ing ambiguity. They are issues th at have deep conseHersh offers a litany of other ordinary language ex- qu ences not onl y for stu dents attemptin g to learn new
pressions that are at odds w ith mathematical mean- bodies of know ledge, but for anyone attempting to
ing: adding (which in ord inary language always leads appreciat e the nature of mathematical thought as well
to an increase in number), difference (signaling a com- as its intellectual history.
parison in ordinary language, but not necessarily subtraction), multiplication (repeated ly adding so that one For this purpose, 1 would like to suggest the followarrives at some thing that is bigger than what was ini- ing complementary slog ans:
tially the case ).
1. " BE AWARE OF THE DOUBLE ENTENDRE."

He points ou t that not only objects and operations but
the logic of requests or demands is problematic as well.
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2 . " BE AWARE OF M ULTIPLE ENTENDRE. "
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the opposite? Who are these mathematicians that appreciate the m eaning? Are we referring to those who
gave birth to the ideas and found th em selves walking on a tight-rope, or are we referring to a twentieth
century embodiment of "mathematician ?" Are there
present day mathematicians who would have difficulty with the concept of zero defining a number of
real world objects? Should there be?
One reason that each of the extensions of numbers
(beyo nd natural numbers-those that Kronecker
spoke of as God-given, but which Russell and Frege
attempted to humanize by establishing them on a settheoretic foundation) met with such resistance among
professionals is that there was an important and
healthy kind of confusion that had to be unraveled
Take the case of " neg a tive number" for exa mple. over time. It is a sort of confusion that is not easily
Whil e "negative" surely fits the bill of sound ing dan- conque red once and for all, but is perhaps built into
gerous and is so mething to avoid (unless of course it the human mind, and reappears with each new disis associated with a biopsy), the Latin translation of covery in all field s of inquiry. That is, in viewing an
that concept (which pre-dated the English translation) extension of already existing concepts, how d o we
wa s just as forebod ing and perhaps more revealing. connect with what exists? What do we expec t of the
These numbers were originally called numeri ficti- newly emerging idea that is in common with th e premeaningfi ctitious numbers. The implication here is not vious one?
onl y that these n umbers are dangerous, but that they
reall y d o not exist- or if th ey do, their existence is Obviously a concept (of number, for example) which
shrouded in mystery.
derives from an earlier one has something in common
with the earlier one. Just as obviously, however, it difWhat can stu dents learn not by disassociating from fers from the original one. Each extension requires that
an English translation, but by embracing su ch trans- we decide how much we want the emerging idea to
lations with an historical and multicultural perspec- deviate from the originaL At what point is th e deviative? Perhaps th e deepest lesson to learn is that they tion so significant that w e can no longer speak of th e
are not fools if they do not immediately understand two concepts in the same breath?
what the concept is all about. No t singly, but taken as
a whole, words like "negative, " "imaginary," "irra- With each extension of number, mathematicians had
tional," "complex" with regard to numbers sign al to ask themselves what there wa s that was so fundasome thing very important. That is, they suggest that mental about the concept from which it w as to be dethe se concepts evolved against considerable resis - rived that had to be held intact- such that letting it
tance. They may come to appreciate that in a quite go w ould completely destroy the concep t.
deep sense, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." If our
st udents have trouble understanding how n umbers At ea rly stages in the history of mathematics, extenare extended, then it w ould be a significant source of sions were characterized by mathematicians' search
so lace for them to appreciate that they are me rely ex- for a "v isible" thread- something linked to the real
perien cing the labor pains of these ideas historically. world, or perhaps a model of some sor t that might be
a bit more abstract than what could be touched or seen.
And why shoul d these ideas hav e had such a labor Just as mathematicians who were confronted with the
intensive birth? Wh y were the y not just accepted as search for some reality that linked the emerg ing conreasonable extensions of existing knowledge? What cept of numerifieti to the ear thiness of the na tural numdoes it mean to say, as Hersh points out, that math- bers, so our students experience discomfort when the y
ematician s appreciate that zero may have meaning in cannot rely upon familiar models in a number systhe above context while ordinary language suggests tem that is supposedly an extension of what is already

BE AWARE OF THE DOUBLE ENTENDRE

Precision of meaning is one thing. An appreciation
for the evo lu tion of ideas and the associated labor
pains is another. The slogan "Be Aware of (rather than
Beware) the Double Entendre" is intended to have an
ameliorative rather than a dismissive quality with regard to the concept of double entendre. What do I have
in mind? While Hersh has found out that some students have trouble understanding a concept like that
of irrational or imaginary numbers because they seek
association with such words which "sound dangerous, undesirable, things to av oid ," I have di scovered
that many are fru strated by a di sinclination to take
seriously the ord inary language equivalent.

6
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comfortable.
We sometimes get the impression that an axiomatic
formulation of mathematics was a watershed that
enabled mathematicians to resolve this problem once
and for all. We thus might conclude erroneously that
it is our students' inability to appreciate an axiomatic
perspective that accounts for their relu ctan ce to accept some of these extensions. We m ight believe that
the culprit then is an overly "concrete" hold on the
prior number system, and furthermore that the concrete hold is rooted in an effort to connect each idea
with ord inary language usa ge. Thus if natural number is associated with objects you can see or touch,
then it su rely is und erstandable that our stu dents
would have a problem that mathematicians do not
have with zero or ne gative elements being numbers
at all.

linquished under matrix multiplication. Yet, we ha ve
come to think of matrices as being a number system
of sorts.
As we depict the actual evolution of number systems,
we can share with our students the historical deb ates
that took pla ce regarding the legitimacy of purported
extensions. But we can do more. If w e en gage them in
creating alternative extensions-ones that challenge
some of their own cherished properties-at what point
do our students get their backs up and say that the
system being created no longer reflects what numbers
are "really about"?

That's the sort of question that can engage our students, once we encourage them not to by-pass the ambiguity of ordinary lan gua ge and to place mathematics on a different sort of pedestal, but rather to see
how the presence of language in the evolution of ideas
But the problem does not (and did not) disappear with is a testimony to the most human problems of cogruthe creation of an axiomatic perspective. If we think tion and emotion as well: How badly do we want
of the natu ral numbers as a system satisfying Peano's something that opens up totally new avenues to expostulates, then we know that there are certain axi- plore, and at what price will we buy it?
oms that such a system must satisfy. But as we extend
this system, we find ou t tha t som e of the properties BE AWARE OF MULTIPLE ENTENDRE
must be relinquished. It is not just that we cannot So far, we have shown how attention to double
" touch" negative numbers that is problematic, but entendre can be advantageous not from the point of
rather that the extended system loses some proper- view of making each new concept more easily underties of number that are associated with the positive stood, but rather as a tool in enabling us to better unintegers and such properti es are cherished by differ- derstand the problematic nature of an entire collecent people in different ways. If the extension from tion of concepts.
positive integers to integers enables us to solve some
new equations, it also raises som e eyebrows. Thus, in There is however another way in which attention to
the extended system we can no longer hold on to ordinary language can be enlightening. This has to
mathematical induc tion (a loss felt perhaps more dra- do less with the translation (and mistranslations) of a
matically in gu ise of the equivalen t well-ordering family of words and grammatical uses in the domains
property). Not every subset of the new system has a of ordinary language vs. mathematics, and more with
least element. Similarly, an awareness that is perhaps an awareness of certain concepts that are embedded
more intuitively understood (with machinery that in our culture in general.
may sound less technical than mathematical induction) is challenged to the hilt when an extension from It lead s us to an issu e alluded to in the above section,
positive to negative rationals leads us to reject the but it puts a totall y new slant on the issue. I begin
stro ngly he ld belief that a sm aller number divided by with the story of a classroom event of sev eral years
a larger number cannot equal a larger nu mber divided ago.
by a smaller one (as in ~ ]/1 = 1 /~1 ) .
I was teaching a talented group (sic) of graduate stuWhen do we reach a point of no return-such tha t we dents who had previously been exposed to a number
no longer think of the newly derived system as being of different strategies for extending number systems.
a number system at all? We know that the deeply Thus, they had postulated newly extende d number
embedded property of commutativity had to be re~ systems; they had derived new systems from old ones

Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal#1 5

7

mak ing use of concep ts such as ordered pairs of ele- and not X simultaneously, they most likely would
ments from the old ones; they had proved all sorts of claim that such is not possible, and in fact is an imthings about the new systems in relation to the old portant element in the arsena l of mathematical arguones; they knew what the concept of equivalence re- men ts.
lation was all abo ut and had seen the relevance of that
concept to extensions; they had been exposed to the Now there is a grain of truth in the students' reacconcept of new systems having a subset isomo rp hic tions, an d I perhap s misin terpreted the ir efforts to reto the old; the y ha d been exposed to alternative his- solve the probl em, but I still found it difficult to untorical develop ment of the real numbers as in the case derstand how they could not be bothered by what
appeare d to be an obvi ous contradiction. In fact, no
of Dedekind's cuts vs. Weier strass' limits.
one menti oned that the new system of complex numI then proposed the follow ing (wha t I thought wa s) bers is not merely an add-on to the old system in the
simple d ilemma :
sense that everything that w as assumed in the old
system was also introduced into the new.
The real numbers can be characterized in an axioma tic way (essentially an Archimede an orde red It is not tha t no one pointed ou t that in the new sysfield, but I was careful to lay out the properties ). I tem, an important property of the old one must be
reviewed for them that wit hin that system, it is relinquished (that of orde r), but rather that no one
possible to prove that there does not exist a num- even entertained the possibility tha t something might
be lost even if the y could not name what it w as.
ber x so that xl =-1.
I then told them tha t one "popular " way of viewing
the set of complex num bers is to define that set as a
one that satisfies all the properties of the previous se t,
but in addition has the followin g property:
There exists a number x so that r

=-1.

Q uestion: How is such a contrad iction possible?
I found their ans w ers perple xin g. Many of them
claimed that the ne w set. the complex numbers, was
a different set than the pre viou s one- the real numbers- so that there was no implied contradiction.!
Some people seemed to believe that the problem wa s
resolved by naming the new system-as if such an act
in and of itself had the power to di ssolve a contradi ction . Some claimed that it is not surp rising to find out
that what we p reviously held to be impossible was in
fact possible since that is ana logous to what growing
up and being educated is all about.

Why is that? It took me a long time to come to appreciate wha t might have been going on, and I have finall y come to an hypothesis that seems worth takin g
seriously.That is, I have come to believe that their disinclination to consider the possibility tha t some thing
had to be relinquished is a functi on of one rather specific notion of progress in our cu lture. Adapting a
phrase of Piaget's that has a slightly different connotati on, I ha ve dubbed th is noti on of p rogress The
American Phenomenon. While there are multip le meanings of progress in ordinary language, a dominant one
seems to assume that progress involves getting more
and more of what youfind desirable (like bein g able to
get a solution to x 2 = -1 wh en it did not previously
exist) without ever losing anything that you previously

held worthwhile.

The fact that an extens ion of a numbe r system provides you w ith something new and desirable but may
at the same time d eprive you of something you previously found desirable is not well understood . But
Many other interesting comments were mad e, and in why so? It may not be a resul t of the fact that the techfact, encou raging students to an alyze this sort of qu es- nical process of exten sion is poorly understood from
tion in a non-threatening way serv ed as a wonde rful a mathemati cal point of view, but ra ther because the
Rorschach test. By examining anoma lies in a specifi c concept of progress in gen era l is filled wi th so many
rather than in a globa l con text, ins tru ctors ma y un- unexplored myths.
earth some interesting student misconceptions. That
is, if asked whe ther or not it would be accep table to So, I am sugges ting that it is not that we need to di shave a system that satisfies the two propositions X tingui sh (and divorce) ordina ry language from p re-

8
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cisc mathe matic al language in orde r to create a mo re
accurate under standi ng of mathematical ideas. Rathe r
it is wort h doing some analysis of words and concepts
in ordinary language that do Hotatall have mathematical counterparts, but that strongly influen ce the way
in which our students th ink abou t ma the matics and
mathem atical de velopment in the first pla ce. Progress
is one such concep t bu t there are other s.
What is needed in orde r to fully appreciate that exten sion of systems ma y have a price to pa y is not only
an issue of mathematical logic. It requires simultaneou sly that w e do some excavation on a concept of
ordinary language that is popularly viewed as unambiguous: the concept of progress. Once more, what
we need is to seek greater rather than lesser ambiguity in order to arrive finally at a view of the concept of
progress that illuminates the interesting discomfort
w e feel when popularly held principles have to be
relinquished.
I conclude with one other concep t that is a meta -mathematical rather than a mathematical one. Sometimes
it is our inability to appreciate fully the ambiguity of
ordinary language that prevents us from understanding not only a particular mathematical concept or an
array of concepts, but rather the nature of mathematical thought itself. Consider the concept of definition.
Most of m y students believe that definitions in mathematics are arbitrary. That is, they tell me that you
can define things any way you want.

criteria that need to be unearthe d before definitions
are accepted . For example, in mos t circumstances, we
do not select defin itions that we believe would lead
to contradictions. Thus the concep t of the slope of a
straight line w ould make little sens e if slope changed
in value dep ending upon which points wer e selected
along the line.
.
But there is something deeper about the concept of
definition which does borrow from ordinary langu age
use of definition. That is, there ar e occasio ns upon
which definitions even in mathematics ser ve some
function other than that of stipulating one expression
for some other. That is, there are occasions upon which
definitions are descriptive in nature." Far from being
arb itrary, these definitions are intended to convey with
a degree of accuracy what it is that accords intuitively
with our beliefs.
So, for example, there are many different ways of de fining a circle in precise mathematical terms. Though,
as Hersh would point out, common language usage
might not distinguish carefully between points along
the rim and interior points (for example), in no case
would we expect that what we pre viously defined as
slope would satisfy the definition of circle. Such a
definition would not accord with our prior sense of
what a circle "really is." To adopt the notion of definition in mathematics as arbitrary is to show a lack of
appreciation for the interesting range of ways the concept of definition functions in ordinary language. It is
to act as if the Socratic search for "justice" or "beauty"
is a pointless venture on the grounds that any shorthand expression would do.

Holding on to a narrow and unambiguous notion of
definition, they essentially see its application in mathematics as the replacement of one arbitrary English
word with some mathematical formu lation. Thus the Once more, it is ordinary language with all its ambislope of a line in a Cartesian co-ordinate system is guity that provides a clue that the concept of definimeant to be a shorthand way of replacing the change tion in mathematics might not be as monolithic as we
in y va lues di vided by the change in x values for an y are led to believe when the claim is made that definitwo points on a straight line.
tions are arbitrary and we can define anything any
way we w ish.
What the concept of arbitrary definition neglects to
appreciate is first of all that no one goes around just CONCLUSION
defining things arbitrarily and that considerable spade So Hersh, in his delightful essay, reminds us that orwork is necessary in ord er to decide what is worth dinary language can be misleading and can inter fere
de fining in the first place. That is, definitions single with students' understanding of mathematical id eas .
out objects with a purposein mind, and frequently that That lesson itself, however, is misleading if we do not
purpose is arrived at as a culminating act of inquiry also take into consideration that ambiguity of lanrather than as a first step (as most texts would have guage can be an asset, especially when the goal is not
us believe). In addition, of course, there are logical necessarily to unearth the preci se meaning of a rela-

Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #15

9

tively narrow mathematical concept (like negative
integer), but rather to appreciate how it is that an array of related concepts (like number) has evolved.
It is by looking at the array of ordinary language meanings (and concomitant emotional baggage) associated
with numbers that we can beg in to imagine a state of
mind that was behind Kronecker's reaction to
Lindemann's demonstration of the transcendental
nature of pi: Just a litt le over a century ago, he said:

What good is your beautiful investigation regarding pi? Why study such
problems, since irrational numbers do
not exist?"
The pedagogical issues are complicated here and I
have made no effort to spell this awareness ou t in

terms of any teaching program. Furthermore, I have
intentionally focused narrowly on the concept of number rather than upon the range of interesting specific
concepts that Hersh has explored. I have also not explored in general the role tha t ordinary language plays
in thinking, nor have I delved in particular into the
role of metaphorical thinking in mathematics-a
thinking that might account for the variety and richness of systems described by language such as "ring,"
"field," "ideal," and even "manifold " and "commutater."!
While what I have claimed does not negate Hersh's
argument, I have attempted to point out that the am bigu ity of ordinary language serves a number of interesting functions beyond the antiseptic one of identifying and delimiting <sic again) its potential in understanding mathematics.
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